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INTRODUCTION
The topic of this essay-state and local tax incentives for
economic development-is a deeply personal subject for me. For
almost twenty years, I served on the Board of Aldermen of New
Haven, Connecticut, and then on that community's Board of Finance.
I Edward A. Zelinsky is the Morris and Annie Trachman Professor of Law at the
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law of Yeshiva University. He is the author of THE ORIGINS
OF THE OWNERSHIP SOCIETY: How THE DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PARADIGM CHANGED
AMERICA (2007), published by Oxford University Press.
For comments on earlier drafts of this essay, Professor Zelinsky thanks Doris, Joshua and
Nathaniel Zelinsky.
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For all of those years, the city's finances were a central concern in my
life.'
During these two decades, I shepherded through the legislative
process many municipal property tax abatements awarded to
developers in return for their promises to invest in the community. I
now suffer from buyers' remorse as to these deals.
In another incarnation, I have found myself in the middle of
vigorous academic debate with those who assert that the dormant
Commerce Clause rule of nondiscrimination prohibits state and local
tax incentives designed to attract and retain investment. In that
debate, I have argued that there is no constitutional barrier to such tax
incentives. In particular, I have argued that it is doctrinally incoherent
to view dormant Commerce Clause nondiscrimination as outlawing
tax incentives while permitting economically and procedurally
equivalent direct expenditures.2 I have also argued that the concept of
dormant Commerce Clause nondiscrimination fails to explain which
tax reductions are constitutionally prohibited and which are
constitutionally permitted.3
My support for municipal tax abatements during my years as a city
official, combined with my more recent writings about the
constitutional permissibility of state and local tax incentives, might
lead some to infer that I am today a supporter of such incentives to
lure investment. The reality is more complex: As a matter of policy, I
am now intensely skeptical of state and local tax incentive packages
designed to stimulate economic development. Unfortunately, I am
equally skeptical that there is a good way to police such incentives.
I. PERSPECTIVES
For purposes of this discussion, it is useful to contrast three
different perspectives on state and local tax incentives. There are
those who view such incentives as essentially benign phenomena.
One rationale for this perception is that government is an insatiable
Leviathan, which will unproductively consume whatever resources it
I For some earlier reflections on this experience, see Edward A. Zelinsky, The Once and
Future Property Tax: A Dialogue with My Younger Self, 23 CARDOZo L. REv. 2199 (2002).
2 For some of the more recent interchanges in this debate, see Edward A. Zelinsky, The
Incoherence of Dormant Commerce Clause Nondiscrimination: A Reply to Professor Denning,
77 MIss. L. J. 653 (2007); Edward A. Zelinsky & Brannon P. Denning, Debate, The Future of
the Dormant Commerce Clause: Abolishing the Prohibition on Discriminatory Taxation, 155 U.
PA. L. REv. PENNUMBRA 196 (2007), available at http://www.pennumbra.com/debates/
debate.php?did=7; Edward A. Zelinsky, Davis v. Department of Revenue: The Incoherence of
Dormant Commerce Clause Nondiscrimination, 44 ST. TAX NoTEs 941 (2007), in 118 TAX
NOTES 57 (July 2, 2007).
3 See Zelinsky, Reply to Professor Denning, supra note 2.
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can grab. If so, it is good whenever government is forced to reduce its
grasp. The best known proponent of this rationale is Professor
Friedman, whose skepticism of an ever-hungry public fisc led him to
favor any tax reduction.4
Professor Gillette offers more nuanced support for state and local
tax incentives. In Professor Gillette's telling of the story, such
incentives are economically efficient signaling devices that help firms
locate where their presence is most beneficial.5
In contrast are those who oppose interjurisdictional tax
competition. Professor Enrich is among the outspoken opponents of
such tax competition.6 Professor Enrich brought the Cuno litigation,
which raised a dormant Commerce Clause challenge to the income
and property tax incentives that Ohio and its municipalities granted to
Daimler-Chrysler to locate a new plant in Toledo.7 That litigation
stimulated much of the recent controversy about the dormant
Commerce Clause concept of nondiscrimination.8 Professor Shaviro
is also skeptical about state and local tax competition. 9 While
Professors Enrich and Shaviro are careful to note that they favor (or,
at least, do not oppose) interjurisdictional competition as to tax rates,
their writings suggest a dim view of other forms of tax
competition.
In between these polar positions are the mushy moderates like me.
On the one hand, I find compelling the argument that tax competition
among states and localities is healthy because such competition
disciplines political officials and allows taxpayers to sort themselves
among jurisdictions by taxpayers' tax and public spending
preferences. On the other hand, targeted tax incentives are generally
inefficient and unfair.
4 See George F. Will, Stimulating Talk Redux, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 28, 2008, at 64 ("Nobel
laureate Milton Friedman ... finally concluded that any tax cut of any size, at any time, for any
purpose, should be supported because individuals spend money more productively than
governments do and waiting to cut taxes until government spending is cut is like waiting for
Godot.").
5 See Clayton P. Gillette, Business Incentives, Interstate Competition, and the Commerce
Clause, 82 MINN. L. REv. 447, 486-87 (1997).
6 See Peter D. Enrich, The Rise-And Perhaps The Fall--of Business Tax Incentives, in
THE FUTURE OF STATE TAXATION 73 (David Brunori ed., 1998) [hereinafter FUTURE]; Peter D.
Enrich, Saving The States From Themselves: Commerce Clause Constraints on State Tax
Incentives for Business, 110 HARv. L. REv. 377 (1996).
7 See Daimler-Chrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332 (2006).
8 For my own contribution to the Cuno oeuvre, see Edward A. Zelinsky, Cuno: The
Property Tax Issue, 4 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 119 (2006); Edward A. Zelinsky, Ohio Incentives
Decision Revisited, 37 ST. TAX NOTES 859 (Sept. 19, 2005), in 108 TAX NOTES 1569
(September 26, 2005); Edward A. Zelinsky, Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler: A Critique, 34 ST. TAX
NOTES 37 (2004), in 105 TAX NOTES 225 (2004).
9 See Daniel Shaviro, An Economic and Political Look at Federalism in Taxation, 90
MICH. L. REv. 895, 908-09 (1992).
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II. PROBLEMS
Much contemporary discussion of tax competition starts with the
seminal argument of Charles Tiebout. Tiebout's initial insights have
spawned a vast literature exploring the potential benefits of tax
competition among municipalities and states.' 0 In the Tiebout world,
local taxes signal the price of local public services. In this world,
taxpayers' mobility among jurisdictions permits them to sort
themselves so that each taxpayer can reside in the jurisdiction with
the combination of public services and taxes he or she finds
congenial. The potential mobility of dissatisfied taxpayers disciplines
local officials to restrain taxes and provide good public services to
keep those taxpayers from leaving for adjacent jurisdictions with
better tax climates and superior public services. The tax price of local
public services also allows taxpayers as voters to compare their
respective communities with surrounding jurisdictions. Such
comparison enables taxpayers, as voters, to further discipline local
officials if such officials perform poorly relative to their peers in other
communities, and to reward such officials for superior performance in
terms of taxes and public services.
The Tiebout model is elegant. Perhaps more importantly, it was
validated in practice by my years as a municipal official. Residents,
both in their capacities as homeowners and as voters, are acutely
sensitive to the tax price of living in their community as compared to
the tax price of residing in neighboring municipalities. Local officials
are aware of this sensitivity and continuously monitor the taxes they
impose in relation to the taxes levied in adjacent jurisdictions.
This analysis suggests that Tieboutian tax competition among
jurisdictions is, in theory and in practice, desirable to discipline
municipal officials and to permit taxpayers to reside in communities
with tax and spending packages corresponding to such taxpayers'
preferences.
However, targeted tax incentives are a different matter. As I look
back on the incentive packages that I helped to implement, I am
troubled on both procedural and substantive grounds. Procedurally,
there is, to start with, an inherent and irremediable information
asymmetry in negotiations between state and local officials and the
corporations and developers with which such officials bargain over
tax incentives. The corporations and developers know their locational
choices and preferences and have no reason to disclose these to the
10 See, e.g., THE TIEBOUT MODEL AT FIFTY (William A. Fischel ed., 2006); Edward A.
Zelinsky, Metropolitanism, Progressivism, and Race, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 665 (1998).
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officials with whom they are bargaining for tax benefits. Indeed,
those negotiating for tax benefits from states and localities have every
reason to hide their true choices and preferences. Consequently, the
message corporations and developers advance in such negotiations-
give us a tax break or we will ignore (or leave) your community-is
difficult for officials to evaluate. Perhaps the corporations and
developers are bluffing; it is difficult for state and local officials
negotiating with them to know, and politically risky for such officials
to find out.
Paralleling the informational imbalances between those seeking
tax benefits and those dispensing tax benefits are the collective action
problems of decentralized government. These problems represent the
flip side of the interjurisdictional competition celebrated by the
Tiebout model. If community X refuses to grant tax incentives to
attract or retain a particular firm, community Y will. This makes it
difficult for officials in community X to resist demands for tax
largesse. Even if communities X and Y can enter into an effective
nonaggression pact under which each will not compete against the
other, there is always community Z and, waiting in the wings,
communities A, B and C.
States and localities are also handicapped in negotiations about tax
incentives by the short time horizons of voters, which translates into
short time horizons for the elected officials these voters pick. Put less
charitably, voters and their representatives can be myopic in granting
tax incentives.
The costs of tax incentives often extend far into the future. For
example, the property tax abatement challenged in Cuno lasted for ten
years.11 Few voters think that far in advance; even fewer elected
officials do. Consequently, the political calculations strongly favor
the granting of tax incentives since the apparent benefits are
immediate and visible-the decision of corporations or developers to
build and invest-while the costs in the form of reduced tax revenues
fall heavily in the future when others will be in office.
Finally, a significant portion of both the electorate and state and
local officialdom succumbs to framing effects, erroneously perceiving
tax incentives as different from economically and procedurally
equivalent direct expenditure subsidies.
12
11 Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc., 386 F.3d 738, 741 (6th Cir. 2004), vacated in part, 547
U.S. 332 (2006).
12 Edward A. zelinsky, Do Tax Expenditures Create Framing Effects? Volunteer
Firefighters, Property Tax Exemptions, and The Paradox of Tax Expenditure Analysis, 24 VA.
TAX REv. 797 (2005).
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In light of these procedural problems, the tax incentives states and
localities grant are, as a substantive matter, often inefficient and
typically unfair. This inefficiency is both technical and allocational.
3
The tax benefits bestowed by states and municipalities are technically
inefficient in that such benefits reward corporations and developers
for investments they would have made anyway. State and local
officials--outbargained because of their lack of information
compared with the firms with which such officials are negotiating,
pressured to grant tax breaks by the likelihood that other communities
will grant such breaks if they do not, and compelled to produce the
immediate benefits of investment in the community-award tax
benefits for investments which would have occurred anyway. The
public fisc is accordingly reduced, but nothing is thereby
accomplished for the local economy since these investments,
nominally lured by tax benefits, would have occurred anyway.
Moreover, tax incentives entail allocational inefficiency as
taxpayers pay discrepant rates for the same public services. Because
economic development incentives place part of the community's tax
base off limits, the remainder of the community's tax base must be
taxed more heavily to provide needed revenues. The higher tax rates
that result interfere with the economic decisions of those more
heavily taxed community members, which leads them, in turn, to
demand the same relief granted to others.
Consider, for example, a city approached by a developer who
promises to construct a new office building in the city's downtown,
but only if he is given property tax abatements for a number of years.
Municipal officials (e.g., me) may suspect that the developer is
bluffing and will in fact build even without the tax relief he is
demanding. But such officials do not know this for sure and are likely
to be risk averse: Who wants to be accused of driving investment and
jobs from the community? And, the internal debate runs, if the city
does not grant the tax abatement, a neighboring community will grant
it and thereby obtain the proposed building. Since either way the city
will not receive any taxes, it might as well get the investment.
Subsequently, as the city's need for municipal revenue grows, the
city must increase its tax rates, but it cannot increase the rates for the
developer who built his new building in reliance on a long-term
abatement. Tax rates consequently go up for other property owners,
who find themselves increasing their rents to pay such taxes and
13 On the distinction, in the context of tax incentives, between technical and allocational
efficiency, see Edward A. Zelinsky, Efficiency and Income Taxes: The Rehabilitation of Tax
Incentives, 64 TEX. L. REV. 973 (1986).
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deferring maintenance to reduce their operating costs. At the end of
the day, older buildings are increasingly burdened with the costs of
the community's public services, which hastens the decline of those
structures. At a minimum, those older buildings find themselves at an
artificial competitive disadvantage since they must pay property taxes
that their new competitor does not.
The community consequently finds itself on a treadmill with
higher tax rates discouraging economic activity and more taxpayers
threatening to depart in face of those rates. Moreover, increasingly
burdened taxpayers can plausibly claim that they are treated unfairly
since others, who received tax incentives, also get public services but
do not pay (or do not pay as much) for such services. Residential
homeowners become increasingly demoralized by the higher tax rates
needed to provide municipal services.
No reader of the relevant economic and legal literature will be
surprised by this scenario. For example, David Brunori observes the
following:
Commentators generally agree that incentives violate the
most basic principles of sound tax policy. Incentives result in
tax systems that are less accountable, less efficient, and less
fair. Moreover, there is more than ample evidence that
incentives do not work. Still, the use of tax incentives has
increased primarily because political leaders lack the will to
reject them. The political benefits of new jobs and increased
economic activity are attractive inducements for offering
incentives. 
14
In a similar vein, Professor Pomp notes that "tax incentives
probably reward corporations for doing what they would have done
anyway. 15 Moreover, he writes, legislators "fear that being perceived
as anti-business or anti-jobs is worse than being seen as promoting
highly visible, albeit ineffective, incentives.'"'
6
My contribution to the debate is that I have lived it.
III. SOLUTIONS?
All of these considerations lead me to a conclusion which is easy
to state but, alas, is difficult to implement: I favor general, Tieboutian
tax competition among jurisdictions to discipline political decision
14 David Brunori, Introduction, in FUTURE, supra note 6, at 6.
15 Richard D Pomp, The Future of the State Corporate Income Tax: Reflections (and
Confessions) of a Tax Lawyer, in FUTURE, supra note 6, at 54.
16 Id.
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makers, but I disfavor targeted tax incentives. The problem with this
theoretically sound conclusion is that there is no feasible way to
effectuate it.
For the reasons already identified, we cannot rely on the self-
discipline of state and local officials to refrain from granting targeted
tax incentives. The political rewards of granting such incentives-the
ability to claim to have attracted investment and jobs-are immediate
and visible. The economic costs of such incentives-reduced tax
revenues-tend to fall in the future. The collective action problems of
competing jurisdictions preclude effective nonaggression pacts
among such jurisdictions.
The alternative is for higher levels of government to impose tax
incentive truces on lower level jurisdictions, i.e., state legislation to
prevent municipalities from granting incentives in competition with
each other; federal legislation, enacted pursuant to Congress's
authority under the Commerce Clause, to similarly stop tax
competition among the states.
At the state level, the laws adopted in the wake of the U.S.
Supreme Court's Kelo decision 17 provide interesting examples. Just as
some state legislatures have, after Kelo, forbidden municipalities to
exercise eminent domain power for economic development
purposes, 18 state legislatures could proscribe municipalities from
extending targeted tax breaks for economic development purposes.
Similarly, Congress has, over the years, used its Commerce Clause
authority to preclude states' exercise of their taxing powers in ways
Congress has deemed harmful to the national economy. The best
known of these federal laws is Public Law 86-272, which forbids
states from imposing income taxes upon certain interstate sellers of
tangible personal property.' 9 Other federal laws aim to prevent
discriminatory taxation of certain interstate transportation
corporations20 while yet other federal laws preclude states and
localities from taxing interstate e-commerce sales.2' During the Cuno
litigation, some members of Congress proposed legislation to
17 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
Is Ilya Somin, The Politics of Econimc Takings, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1185 (2008).
19 An Act of Sept. 14, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-272, 73 Stat. 555 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§
381-391 (2000)). For the Supreme Court's construction of P.L. 86-272, see Wis. Dep't of
Revenue v. William Wrigley, Jr., Co., 505 U.S. 214 (1992).
20 See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 11501 (2000) (forbidding states and localities from imposing any
"tax that discriminates against a rail carrier providing [interstate] transportation"); see also 49
U.S.C. § 14502 (restricting the property taxation of "motor carrier transportation
property" used in interstate commerce); 49 U.S.C. § 40116 (restricting the property
taxation of "air carrier transportation property").
21 Internet Tax Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, §§ 1100-1308, 112 Stat. 2681 (1999)
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2006 & Supp. 2008)).
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authorize state tax incentives for economic development.22 By the
same token, Congress could enact legislation blocking state tax
incentives for economic development purposes.
Despite my skepticism of targeted tax incentives as a matter of
policy, for two reasons I doubt that either federal or state legislation
along these lines is appropriate. First, I fear that such legislation, as
finally enacted, would prove to be the proverbial cure that is worse
than the disease. Once the decision has been made at the state or
federal level to restrain tax competition legislatively, it is politically
naive to suppose that only targeted tax competition for economic
development purposes will be outlawed. State and local officials
prefer greater freedom to pursue their personal, political, and policy
objectives. They will thus seek broader legislation that proscribes, not
just the targeted tax competition that is troubling as a matter of policy,
but the healthy Tieboutian competition that is a desirable feature of
our decentralized system of state and local finance.
On more than one occasion during my career as a local official, I
would have welcomed participation in a state-enforced cartel of local
governments and the consequent release from the discipline imposed
by neighboring communities' tax rates. By the time legislation
curtailing tax competition emerges from the state or federal legislative
process, it would likely wind up inhibiting healthy, as well as
undesirable, tax competition.
Of course, those who believe that all tax competition is good (or
bad) do not need to distinguish in this way. But for those of us who
believe that Tiebout tax competition is desirable but targeted tax
incentives are not, it is a real danger that legislation initially aimed at
the latter will end up proscribing the former.
Second, even if there is agreement to ban targeted tax incentives
for economic development purposes without inhibiting more
generalized and desirable forms of tax competition, I am skeptical
that there are workable standards to implement such agreement. To
paraphrase Justice Stewart, I know the targeted tax incentives I
oppose when I see them.23 That, however, does not mean that I can
formulate a workable legal test to identify such incentives.
Suppose, for example, that a state legislature outlaws any
municipal tax policy enacted to stimulate economic development.
Such a standard is overly broad. Communities reduce their general tax
rates, inter alia, to create more favorable tax environments for
22 Walter Hellerstein, Cuno and Congress: An Analysis of Proposed Federal Legislation
Authorizing State Economic Development Incentives, 4 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 73, 73 (2006).
23 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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business. Such tax rate reductions lie at the core of the Tiebout vision
of beneficial tax competition among jurisdictions.
Suppose that the legislature instead proscribes all tax policies
aimed at a single taxpayer. Intuitively, that standard is initially
compelling. However, any tax policy can be made to appear generally
available to a class of taxpayers, e.g., a property tax abatement for
everyone who will construct a twenty story office building within the
next twelve months. We could, in such cases, ask the courts to probe
the legislative motivation for such legislation to determine if there
is a subjective intent to help a particular taxpayer. However, I am
skeptical that such judicial policing is feasible or desirable. At
best, such policing is likely to lead to a continuing cat-and-mouse
game whereby legislators adopt more elaborate and more opaque
statutory formulas to obscure the intent to benefit a single taxpayer.
Or suppose that Congress outlaws states with income taxes from
extending accelerated depreciation deductions for economic
development purposes. Here again there is a serious problem: Some
believe accelerated depreciation more accurately reflects the
economic decline of tangible property than do slower forms of
depreciation. 24 If so, there is no workable standard distinguishing the
state legislature that adopts accelerated depreciation as a targeted tax
subsidy from the legislature that embraces such depreciation as the
best way to measure firms' net incomes.
CONCLUSION
At the end of the day, these considerations lead me to doubt that an
acceptable solution to the problem of targeted tax incentives can be
articulated or implemented.
My skepticism about targeted tax incentives does not imply that
state and local governments have no constructive role bolstering their
respective economies. To the contrary, by providing at reasonable
cost good public services which make communities safe, clean,
affordable, well-educated and well-governed, states and
municipalities make themselves desirable places to live and invest.
The political dilemma is that the electoral costs of restraining public
spending are typically acute and short-term, while the benefits of
efficient and productive government may not manifest themselves
until well into the future. This makes it difficult for elected officials to
pursue sensible business-attracting policies for the long-run. Such
political calculations reinforce the tendency of officials to pursue the
24 See Douglas A. Kahn, Accelerated Depreciation-Tax Expenditure or Proper
Allowance for Measuring Net Income?, 78 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1979).
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kind of targeted tax incentives that yield apparent short-term
benefits while delaying the fiscal and economic costs until later.
I wish I could end this personal and pessimistic essay on a high
note, perhaps by proposing a solution or, more modestly, by
suggesting the direction in which we might search for a solution.
Instead, I must end with the admonition that not all problems have
acceptable solutions and, at least for the foreseeable future, the
problem of targeted tax incentives for economic development is one
of these.

